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INTRODUCTION
Theodore Roethke, a twentieth-century American poet, understood that
when perceivedly unacceptable parts of ourselves give us anxiety, we tend to
project that feeling onto something else:
0 what's the weather in a Beard?
It's windy there, and rather weird,
And when you think the sky has cleared
-Why, there is Dirty Dinky.
Suppose you walk out in a Storm,
With nothing on to keep you warm,
And then step barefoot on a Worm
-Of course, it's Dirty Dinky.
As I was crossing a hot hot Plain,
I saw a sight that caused me pain,
You asked me before, I'll tell you again:
-It looked like Dirty Dinky.
Last night you lay a-sleeping? No!
The room was thirty-five below;
The sheets and blankets turned to snow.
-He'd got in: Dirty Dinky.
You'd better watch the things you do.
You'd better watch the things you do.
You're part of him; he's part of you
-You may be Dirty Dinky.'
Courts dealing with issues involving lesbians and gay men express homophobic
anxiety through the creation of their own "Dirty Dinky."
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As at least one psychologist has put it, homophobic attitudes give people
a way of "avoid[ing] anxiety associated with unacceptable parts of
themselves." 2 When courts face cases involving the rights of lesbians and gay
men, they too frequently experience anxiety and react by portraying the
homosexual as a symbol of something they believe is comfortingly antithetical
to themselves.
Not unexpectedly, homophobic attitudes pervade judicial decisions denying
rights to homosexuals. It is, however, somewhat confounding to detect
degrading stereotypes about lesbians and gay men in decisions that purport to
advance lesbian and gay rights. By way of example, a recent Virginia Court
of Appeals decision, Bottoms v. Bottoms,4 was one that civil libertarians and
commentators had hailed as a victory for homosexuals.' That Bottoms case,
however, was paradoxical. Although in Bottoms, the lesbian mother emerged
triumphant with her child, the court of appeals nevertheless promoted certain
damaging, outmoded notions about homosexuals.
While the judgments in certain cases can seduce us into formulating
optimistic theories about potential change in the law, sometimes more subtle
insinuations within judicial decisions become impediments to progress. This
2. Gregory M. Herek, The Social Psychology ofHomophobia: TowardA Practical Theory, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 923, 929 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM.
L.Q. 71, 74 (1988) (employing term "judicial homophobia"); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (1988); Robin L. West, The Authoritarian Impulse in
Constitutional Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 543 (1988) ("Chief Justice Burger strikes an unfortunately
common cord in Hardwick when he argues that the Georgia legislature's homophobic statute should be
upheld in part because sodomy historically has been regarded as a crime worse than rape.").
4. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276 (Va.Ct.App. 1994) (Rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995)).
5. See, e.g., And a Mother, Too, AM. SURVEY, July 2, 1994, at 25 ("The decision is radical for
Virginia, which (in law, at least) has an Old-South attitude to sex."); A Victory for Gays and The Family,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 23, 1994, at A16 ("Some will say this ruling is a victory for gay rights.
Certainly, it must be welcome news for lesbians and gay men who are good parents but fear that their
sexual orientation alone might be enough to have their children taken away in any custody dispute."); Peter
Baker, Lesbians Win a Round in Conservative Heartland, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 23, 1994 (News) ("If
a conservative state such as Virginia effectively endorses gay couples as appropriate, some critics said[]
it sends a message that other courts across the country may find hard to resist."); Lesbian Wins Back Her
Son, TORONTO STAR, June 22, 1994, at A15 (Paula Ettelbrick, the director of public policy for the National
Center for Lesbian Rights, is quoted as saying: "'We applaud the ability of the appeals court to reject the
homophobic ruling of the trial court.'"); Grandmother Appealing Decision Giving Lesbian Custody of Son,
N.Y. TiMEs, June 26, 1994, §1, at 1 ("[Glay rights advocates . . . had viewed the appellate opinion as
a major victory that was likely to bolster the cases of homosexual parents nationwide."); Ben Maclntyre,
Lesbian Mother Ruled Fit to Be Parent, THE TIMES (London), June 23, 1994, at Overseas News ("The
ruling was hailed by gay groups as a victory for homosexual parents. 'It sends a message nationally that
sexual orientation has no relevance to the ability to parent a child,' the Washington-based National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force said yesterday. "); Reuniting a Mother and Her Child, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June
24, 1994, at 18 ("The decision, which may be appealed to the state Supreme Court, makes Virginia one
of only about 10 states to rule that homosexuality doesn't automatically make a parent unfit."); Sandra
Sanchez, Lesbian Mom Wins Custody of Va. Toddler, USA TODAY, June 22, 1994, at 10A ("The ruling
brought cheers from gay groups nationwide."); Greg Schneider, Lesbian Regains Custody of Her Son,
VIRGINIAN PILOT AND LEDGER STAR (Norfolk), June 22, 1994, at Al ("'Virginia has now joined the
consensus of other states,' said Peter Swisher, a family law expert at the University of Richmond Law
School."); Tom Billman; Dean Mellberg; Sharon Bottoms, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 4, 1994,
at 18 ("The case is a symbolic victory for gay-rights groups and a setback for conservatives.").
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article explores certain preconceptions that surface when homosexuals assert
the right to custody of their own children.
This author has chosen as a focal point the judicial approach to
homosexuality in parental or custodial matters not just because that context is
manageably narrow, but also because it tends to breed homophobic stereotypes.
One reason for this tendency is the requirement that courts base custody
determinations on what is in the best interests of the child.' Because the "best
interests" test is malleable, affords courts broad discretion, and encompasses
multiple factors, it invites judges' personal moral standards, misconceptions
and prejudices.7
As other critics have pointed out, courts considering what is in the best
interests of the child with a lesbian or gay parent have viewed the homosexual
as a mentally ill person' or as a child molester.' Such courts have also
branded the homosexual parent as one prone to convert the child to
6. Historically courts making custody decisions had a parental preference presumption, which ensued
from a societal perception that the traditional nuclear family was the best context for raising children. See
Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Needfor Legal Alternatives When
the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 879-80 (1984). If, however, a natural
parent was deemed unfit and thus rebutted the parental preference presumption, the court became a parens
patriae and became vested with broad discretion to act in the child's best interest. See Finlay v. Finlay,
148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (Judge Cardozo stated: "[The Chancellor] . . . acts as parens patriae to
do what is best for the interest of the child."). For discussions of the "best interests of the child" test, see
Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1
(1984); Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1987); Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law,
36 ARiz. L. REV. 11 (1994); Janet Leach Richards, The Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties:
Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 NOVA L. REV. 733 (1992); Myra G. Sencer, Adoption in the Non-
Traditional Family-a Look at Some Alternatives, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191 (1987); Nancy B. Shernow,
Recognizing Constitutional Rights of Custodial Parents: The Primacy of the Post-Divorce Family in Child
Custody Modification Proceedings, 35 UCLA L. REV. 677 (1988).
7. See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 3 ("[Flor judges, custody cases bring forth more of their emotion
and personal background than almost any other type of case they deal with."); Fitzgerald, supra note 6,
at 56 ("The 'best interest' standard is peculiarly malleable to diverse political agendas precisely because
it reflects no individual's interest. Instead, the standard is a vessel which judges and legislatures may fill
with their own changing definitions."); David P. Russman, Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests?,
27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 31, 35 (1993) ("Discrimination against homosexuals is prevalent in the family
law context where judges and agencies are able to exercise broad discretion"); Sencer, supra note 6, at
193 ("The best interest standard is often undefined and lacks definition. This leaves the choice and
application of factors in deciding best interests to the judiciary."); Shernow, supra note 6, at 684 (discussing
the critics of the "best interests" standards who believe that it means that the "custodial parent is . . . at
the mercy of the trial judge's moral values and prejudices."); Shaista-Parveen Ali, Comment, Homosexual
Parenting: Child Custody and Adoption, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1012 (1989) (discussing how "best
interests" standards, especially in cases involving homosexuals, "sometimes encompass the court's personal
morality standard."); Comment, Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1629, 1630-31 (1989) ("[Sleveral courts have used the best interests standards to deny custody
to gay and lesbian parents."); Felicia Meyers, Gay Custody and Adoption: An Unequal Application of the
Law, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 839, 841 (1993) (discussing how courts have allowed "judicial misconceptions
and prejudice to enter into the [best interestsl analysis.").
8. See Steve Suseoff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian:
Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852, 870-76 (1985); Ali, supra note 7, at 1013.
9. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 843-45; Russman, supra note 7, at 37, 59; Ali, supra note 7, at 1018.
See also H. CURRY & D. CLIFFORD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN & GAY COUPLES 129 (4th ed. 1986)
(explaining that 97% of child molesters are heterosexual males).
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homosexuality,'" to expose the child to societal ridicule, or actually to
infect the child with AIDS. 2
Significantly, courts have used several approaches to determine the fitness
of a homosexual parent. A minority have concluded that lesbians and gay men
are unfit custodians as a matter of law.'3 Other courts have applied what is
typically denominated the "nexus" approach, which means that custody will
be denied only where there is proof that the parent's sexual orientation has or
will adversely affect the child.'4 Other courts, rejecting the per se unfitness
approach, have instead opted for a presumption that exposure to the
homosexual parent harms or will harm the child.' 5 Such courts condition
custody or visitation on certain restrictions or behavioral modifications of the
homosexual parent.16
10. See Joseph Evall, Sexual Orientation and Adoptive Matching, 25 FAM. L.Q. 347, 353 (1991)
(Discussing how "statutory restrictions on the provision of foster or adoptive homes by gay men and
lesbians may reflect a legislative belief that ... the presence of a gay parent poses a 'risk' to the child's
development, e.g., the child will 'become' gay."); Meyers, supra note 7, at 843-45; Donald H. Stone,
The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent Is Homosexual or Lesbian-An Empirical Study,
23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 711, 724 (1989) ("The position that homosexual and lesbian parents will influence
their children to develop same[-lsex orientations is prevalent in custody cases and is a view that society
at large accepts."); Ali, supra note 7, at 1016-17.
11. See Meyers, supra note 7, at 843-45; Ali, supra note 7, at 1020-21; Russman, supra note 7, at
37; Suseoff, supra note 8, at 877-79.
12. See Ali, supra note 7, at 1013, 1019 (quoting definition of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
in WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 66 (9th ed. 1986) ("condition ... associated especially with
male homosexuality and intravenous drug abuse.")); David S. Dooley, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad
Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes,
26 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 422-23 (1990); Russman, supra note 7, at 37, 60; Tougher Time for Gays'
Custody, 74 A.B.A. J. 24 (Jan. 1988).
13. See Stephen B. Pershing, "Entreat Me Not to Leave Thee:" Bottoms v. Bottoms and the Custody
Rights of Gay and Lesbian Parents, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 289, 290 n.5 (1994) ("A conclusive
presumption or per se rule it is indeed, for if read literally, it allows for no exceptions, permits no kind
or degree of evidence to overcome it, and most importantly, applies even in the face of countervailing
presumptions and shifts in burdens of proof."); Russman, supra note 7, at 44 ("In such cases, gay parents
lose the custody dispute regardless of whether their homosexuality is shown to adversely affect the child.").
But see Dooley, supra note 12, at 407 (under per se approach, "parent's homosexuality presents a rebuttable
presumption that the parent is unfit."); Meyers, supra note 7, at 840-41 ("[Tlhe irrebuttable presumption
of unfitness places the insurmountable obstacle on gay parents to prove they are fit.").
14. See, e.g., Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321, 324 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (enumerating factors to
consider in determining adverse impact on child) (citing Nale v. Nale, 409 So. 2d 1299, 1301-02 (La. Ct.
App. 1982)); People v. Brown, 212 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (concluding there was little
evidence that appellants' homosexual relationship rendered him unfit). See e.g., Ali, supra note 7, at 1022-
24 (discussing emergence of nexus test); Dooley, supra note 12, at 411-13 (examining three approaches
to determining parental fitness); Russman, supra note 7, at 47 (under nexus test, "the court focuses on the
parenting abilities and the home environment rather than the parent's homosexuality."); Sencer, supra note
6, at 201-07 (describing cases in which courts rejected per se unfitness standard for homosexual parents).
15. Dooley, supra note 12, at 396, 409 (Explaining that 'middle ground approach' "unlike the per
se approach, frowns only on homosexual conduct and not on the mere status of being homosexual.") See
also Meyers, supra note 7, at 842.
16. See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (prohibiting mother's
female lover from contacting children); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (affirming
order that mother's female lover not be in children's presence during visitations); Newsome v. Newsome,
256 S.E.2d 849, 853 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming requirement that child be kept out of the presence
of her mother's lover). See generally Ali, supra note 7, at 1022 (discussing compromise approach of
.granting homosexuals 'conditional' custody or visitation."); Dooley, supra note 12, at 409-11 (analyzing
approach of courts that condition custody or visitation on certain restrictions); Meyers, supra note 7, at
842 (When courts condition custody or visitation on certain restrictions, that approach "does give the gay
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Inherent in all such approaches is the "best interests" test. That is, built
into the per se approach is the foregone conclusion that life with a lesbian
mother or gay father is not in the "best interest" of the child. 17 As such, the
per se unfitness treatment of the homosexual automatically imbibes the assorted
preconceptions about the supposedly dangerous proclivities of such a parent.
The other approaches, moreover, which require courts to consider whether the
homosexuality has an adverse effect upon the child or to decide what
restrictions to impose upon the parent that will ameliorate the presumed
adverse effect on the child, summon the same collection of preconceptions into
the deliberative process. "
It is this author's thesis that courts create a mythic image of the
homosexual. That mythic image constitutes an amalgam of all of the
preconceptions that underlie the usual justifications that courts give for denying
custody to a lesbian or gay parent.19 The image that materializes in judicial
decisions is a composite of two separate stereotypes of homosexuals: the first,
as an emblem of dangerous malum in se2" criminality, and the second, as
someone with a life-style devoid of any marital or familial attributes. This
article explores the merging of those two stereotypes in three cases in Virginia,
a state renowned for its conservativism in the area of lesbian and gay rights.2
In Part I of this article, I examine two cases, Doe v. Doe22 and Roe v.
Roe.2 In Doe, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that a mother's admitted
lesbian relationship was insufficient to justify severance of her parental rights.
parent some opportunity of retaining custody and/or visitation, it does so at the expense of the parent's
sexual privacy."); Russman, supra note 7, at 44-45 (Such restrictions "include prohibitions against
overnight visitations or against visitations when the gay parent's lover is present. Additionally, courts may
allow visitation or custody only upon termination of the parent's homosexual relationship or upon a promise
that the gay parent will not kiss the child."); Sencer, supra note 6, at 203 ("Jurisdictions have denied the
homosexual parentovernight visitation, excluded the homosexual parent's partner from being present during
visitation with the parent, or prohibited any contact with homosexuals or homosexual activity." (footnotes
omitted)). Such conditional orders derive from a view that sexual orientation is not immutable, but
something which the individual can control and change. It is viewed as correlative to criminal conduct,
which can be corrected or reformed. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
17. See Dooley, supra note 12, at 396 (discussing how certain rationales support the per se approach
and the approach of courts that condition custody or visitation on certain restrictions); Meyers, supra note
7, at 840-41. While the nexus approach, which requires the court to consider whether the homosexual
has harmed or will harm the child, may not subsume the rationales in the form of a standard or
presumption, it nevertheless invites a court to consider the same preconceptions in the context of the harm
analysis.
18. See articles discussed supra note 17.
19. Suseoff, supra note 8, at 859, correctly suggests that in denying "custody solely on the basis of
a parent's sexual orientation," judges "take 'tacit judicial notice' of their personal beliefs about gay and
lesbian parents and the purported effect of those parents' sexual orientation on their children." In Suseoff's
view, "[wihen articulated, these beliefs are seen to be founded on social stereotypes and unsupported
assumptions." Id.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 73-79.
21. See, e.g., And a Mother Too, supra note 5; Baker, supra note 5; Schneider, supra note 5; see
also Stone, supra note 10, at 727 (In response to a survey question on how attorneys advise lesbian mothers
seeking custody, an attorney in Virginia "responded by stating that 'she [the mother] is highly likely to
lose! . . . ITihe choice is one of lifestyle/sexual preference vs. her desire for custody.'").
22. 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
23. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
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In Roe, that same court concluded that a father's continuous exposure of his
child to his homosexual relationship made him an improper custodian as a
matter of law. Although the homosexual parent won in Doe and lost in Roe,
the cases are identical in the most crucial respect. That is, both the Doe and
Roe courts portray the homosexual parents in essentially the same way-as
dangerous criminals and as individuals engaged in a life-style bereft of any and
all family qualities.
In Part II, I examine the more recent decisions in Bottoms24 by initially
addressing the ostensible contrasts between the approaches in the trial court,
the intermediate appellate court, and the Virginia Supreme Court. From there,
I demonstrate how such seemingly disparate avenues through the same dispute
actually converge. That is, although the intermediate appellate court appears
to recognize the lesbian mother's right to custody of her own child, it, like the
court below, nevertheless persists in equating homosexuality with a malum in
se crime and depicting the homosexual home as antipodal to the family hearth.
Beneath the surface, the intermediate appellate court's approach also resembles
that of the Supreme Court of Virginia, which ultimately rejected the mother's
custody claim. Specifically, I will show that the supreme court made explicit
the very discrimination and prejudice that was implicit in the reasoning of the
court below.
This article concludes where it began-with Theodore Roethke's incubus,
"Dirty Dinky." In so doing, I suggest that the only real advancement in the
area of lesbian and gay rights must come about not merely in the form of
results in which homosexuals are deemed to be the prevailing parties, but must
entail a conscious judicial effort to eradicate the underlying anxiety that
activates homophobia. Thus, the real problem is that when courts portray a
homosexual as a dangerous anti-familial criminal, they engender more anxiety,
which, in turn, cyclically engenders more homophobia. As such, meaningful
progress in the area of homosexual rights has to involve the dissolution of what
has become an automatic judicial association between same-sex love and
dangerous malum in se criminality. Also, the end of the vicious cycle of
prejudice has to entail the formation of a new nexus, one between the
homosexual household and the family home.
I. THE MALUM IN SE ANTI-FAMILIAL CRIMINAL IN
DOE V. DOE AND ROE V. ROE
A. Doe v. Doe
In Doe v. Doe,' when the married couple separated, the infant son stayed
with his mother. As Jane Doe described it, although her ex-husband had a
24. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
25. 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
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Ph.D., he "led a rather aimless life for approximately two years after their
separation, being generally unemployed and providing her with little child
support. "26 Apparently the turning point in Mr. Doe's life was his acceptance
of a job at Ferrum College in Virginia. At the time of the actual trial in Doe,
John Doe was a tenured professor.
John had obtained a divorce from Jane, remarried, and then had a child
with his second wife. His first child, however, continued to live with Jane in
Ohio and periodically visited him and his new wife in Virginia. Eventually,
John Doe and his wife, over Jane's objection, took the child to Virginia and
shortly thereafter sought and obtained permanent custody. At that time, Jane
still had her visitation rights.
Later, John's second wife, Ann, petitioned the court for adoption of the
Doe child. At the hearing, Ann said that she wished to adopt the boy because
of the distance between the two homes and the "difference in life styles
between the two areas."27 What Ann explained that she and her husband
wished "to solidify their family unit by having Jack [the son] as a permanent
member and expressed concern over the relationship between Jane and the
woman with whom she live[d] in Ohio."28
Jane testified openly about her relationship with the other woman and
described them as "'married in the sense that we have a primary relationship
and that we have committed ourselves to living our lives together and to
supporting each other.'"29 Jane believed that "the marriage was spiritual"
and said that she and the other woman had gone through a marital ceremony
with a Sufi priest as a way of "acknowledg[ing] the importance of the
relationship," one which she admitted was at times sexual.3" John and Ann
stated that the child had not actually expressed any problems in accepting the
relationship between his mother and "her friend." 3
The trial court ultimately permitted the adoption and severed all of Jane's
parental rights. In so doing, it stated:
The open lesbian relationship now engaged in by Jane Doe, and
which relationship she says will continue, would have a definite
detrimental effect on Jack if he is permitted to visit and live
with his mother, especially during his formative years and that
his being exposed to this relationship would result in serious
26. Id. at 801.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 802.
30. Id. Jane had responded to questions "about the effect of her son growing up in two households,
one where there is a husband and wife relationship and the other a homosexual relationship between two
women." Id. Specifically, Jane said that she did not "see any conflict." Id. What the court found
significant was her statement: "If at any point I did see a conflict I would do whatever I had to do, which
would include severing a relationship with Moya or anyone else for Jack's sake." Id. See infra notes 83-88
and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 801.
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emotional and mental harm to this child, and that his best
interest will be promoted by the adoption.32
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and found that the trial
court's finding was not supported by the evidence. The court pointed out that
"[a]lthough there was testimony that [Jane Doe's] relationship with the woman
with whom she lives is unorthodox, the testimony is also that Jane Doe is an
exceptionally well-educated, stable, responsible and sensitive individual." 3"
In fact, the witnesses who described Jane were all quite complimentary.
34
In the court's view, the petitioners had not provided the trial court with
a valid reason why the natural mother should be "permanently deprived of her
child.""5 As the court put it, if "it is solely her lesbian relationship which
renders her unfit," then the petitioners had the burden of showing that the
relationship made the continuance of the parent-child relationship "detrimental
to the child's welfare. "36 As the court concluded, the petitioner had simply
not introduced such evidence.
Significantly, the court refused to "hold that a woman who is a lesbian and
a man who is a homosexual are per se unfit to be parents" and that such
automatic unfitness results in forfeiture of a child.37 The court stressed that
"the most drastic and far-reaching action" a court can take is to issue a final
order of adoption, which is "often as devastating as though the child had been
delivered at birth to a stranger instead of into the arms of its natural mother
or father."38
The real test, according to the court, is "whether the consequences of harm
to the child of allowing the parent-child relationship to continue are more
severe than the consequences of its termination.""9 The court concluded that
the petitioners neither met the test nor showed that "Jane's lesbian relationship
would have a detrimental effect on Jack and would result in serious emotional
and mental harm to the child."'
The court, however, carefully qualified its decision in the form of a
proclamation that it was "not to be construed as approving, condoning, or
sanctioning such unorthodox conduct, even in the slightest degree. "" The
court, moreover, said that it was "not unmindful" of Jane Doe's representation
32. Id. at 804.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 804-05.
36. Id. at 805.




41. Id. at 806.
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that "should it become necessary, for her son's sake, she would sever the
relationship with the woman with whom she now lives. "42
B. Roe v. Roe
Roe v. Roe43 was a custody battle between the natural parents, which
again forced the court to consider the child's best interest. 4  In Roe,
however, the Supreme Court of Virginia used that best interest standard to
deny custody to the gay father.
Initially, Catherine and David Roe had separated and entered into a
property settlement agreement, which granted full custody of their only child
to the mother. Eventually, the father had to care for his daughter when
Catherine underwent extensive surgery and medical treatment for cancer. When
the father actually petitioned the court for a change of the child's custody to
him, the mother opposed it. Although the mother acknowledged that her ex-
husband had helped with the child's care, she stated that she was recovering,
had actually returned to work, and could soon resume full-time child care. The
parties nevertheless entered into a consent decree, which acknowledged that
the mother was still physically incapable of caring for the child, awarded
custody to the father, and reserved reasonable visitation rights to the
mother.45 As a result, the child stayed with her father, but frequently visited
her mother.
About four years later, Catherine petitioned the court for a temporary
restraining order, in which she alleged:
that it had just come to her attention that the father was living
with a man who was his homosexual lover, that the two men
occupied the same bed in a bedroom in the house in which the
father lived with the child, that the child had reported seeing
the two men 'hugging and kissing and sleeping in bed together,'
and that other homosexuals visited the home and engaged in
similar behavior in the child's presence.'
Catherine also asserted that the child, who was then nine years old, "hated"
the father's lover, was unhappy in her father's home and wished to return to
her mother.47 The mother sought not only to enjoin the father from exercising
42. Id. Chief Justice Carrico authored the dissenting opinion, emphasizing that the evidence supported
the trial court's finding that "continuance of the relationship between Jack Doe and his mother 'would have
a definite detrimental effect' on the boy." Id. at 807.
43. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
44. See supra notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text.
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his custody rights, but also to obtain for herself an award of permanent
custody.
After a hearing, the trial court granted joint legal custody of the child to
the father and mother.48 Under the order, the arrangement was that the child
would live with her father during the school year and then with her mother
in the summer. The trial court also gave each parent extensive visitation when
the child was living with the other parent. The order, however, conditioned
the father's custody upon his "not sharing the same bed or bedroom with any
male lover or friend while the child [was] present in the home."'4
In addition, the trial court found that "each parent had been a fit, devoted,
and competent custodian. "50 After interviewing the child, the court described
her as a "very lovely, outgoing, bright and intelligent child . . . a very happy
child [who] seemed to be well adjusted and outgoing."5 The trial court
specifically determined that there was no evidence that the father's conduct
adversely affected the child. The reason the trial court gave for requiring that
the father not share the same bed or bedroom with his lover was as follows:
[T]his relationship of sharing the same bed or bedroom with the
child being in the home would be one of the greatest degrees
of flaunting that one could imagine. It flies in the face of Brown
v. Brown, and it flies in the face of society's mores anyway.
52
Onappeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia expanded upon the trial court's
condemnation of the father's conduct as defiant of societal morality. It
emphasized that its decision in Brown to affirm the chancellor's removal of
sons from an adulterous mother "was not based on the mother's adulterous
relationship in the abstract, but rather on the fact that it was conducted in the
children's presence."" 3 The Roe court then highlighted the fact that "[ilt was
Mrs. Brown's exposure of the children to an immoral and illicit relationship
which rendered her an unfit and improper person to have their custody. "54





52. Id. at 693 (citations omitted).
53. Id. In Brown v. Brown, 237 S.E.2d 89 (Va. 1977), the trial court had transferred custody of the
children to their father because of a showing that while the mother had custody, she lived with her lover
in an adulterous relationship. In unanimously affirming the trial court's ruling, the court emphasized that
"[an illicit relationship to which minor children are exposed cannot be condoned." Brown, 237 S.E.2d
89, 91. See Katharine A. Salmon, Note, Child Custody Modification Based On a Parent's Non-Marital
Cohabitation: Protecting the Best Interests of the Child in Virginia, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 915, 921 (1993)
("The supreme court probably stopped short of fashioning a per se rule by requiring that non-marital
cohabitation be given 'the most careful consideration in a custody proceeding.' At the very least, however,
Brown requires Virginia courts to presume that such relationships are harmful to children.") (quoting
Brown, 237 S.E.2d at 91).
54. 324 S.E.2d at 693.
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father's continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship
render[ed] him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law. 55
To embellish the immorality motif, the mother had argued that the damage
to her child actually exceeded the damage to the children in Brown and that
there was even greater societal condemnation of homosexual conduct than of
adultery, the grounds for denial of custody in Brown.56 The Roe court,
apparently acquiescing in such reasoning, stated:
[W]e have no hesitancy in saying that the conditions under
which this child must live daily are not only unlawful but also
impose an intolerable burden upon her by reason of the social
condemnation attached to them, which will inevitably afflict her
relationships with her peers and with the community at large.
The father's unfitness is manifested by his willingness to
impose this burden upon her in exchange for his own
gratification."
The court thus concluded that the deleterious impact of the father's conduct
upon the child could not be allayed by doing what the trial court did-that is,
effectually evicting the father from his lover's bedroom.58 Rather, as the
supreme court saw it, "[t]he child's awareness of the nature of the father's
illicit relationship is fixed and cannot be dispelled. ""
Further, the Roe court called the father's reliance upon Doe v. Doe
"misplaced."60 As the Roe court explained, Doe was not a custody dispute,
but a disputed adoption. The Roe court then underscored what it believed was
a crucial distinction between custody determinations, "which are ad hoc and
subject to change upon changing conditions," and what Doe involved
-adoptions, which are "final and irrevocable." 6  The Roe court said that
in Doe, it had "declined to hold that every lesbian mother or homosexual
father is per se an unfit parent." 62 The Roe case, however, involved the
"question of the impact of a homosexual relationship upon a child in the
context of day-to-day custody."63 As such, the issue in Roe was purportedly
55. Id. at 694.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citations omitted).
58. Id; cf supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
59. 324 S.E.2d at 694.
60. Id. at 693.
61. Id. at 694. Suseoff has questioned this distinction:
The Virginia high court distinguished Roe from Doe v. Doe since in the earlier case the lesbian
mother's parental rights would have been terminated had the father's new wife been allowed to
adopt the child. In this analysis, the court overlooked the fact that severing both custody and
visitation rights amounted to terminating the father's parental rights.
Suseoff, supra note 8, at 898.
62. 324 S.E.2d at 694 (emphasis removed).
63. Id.
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the very terrain into which Doe did not tread. As the Roe court put it, in Doe
it had "stopped far short of finding [the lesbian mother to be] a fit and proper
custodian for her son, or even of approving his visitations in her home, while
her existing living arrangements continued."' Through its distinction of Doe,
the Roe court implied that had Doe involved custody instead of adoption, the
lesbian mother would have lost.
C. The Composite Image: The Malum In Se Anti-Familial Criminal
The Doe and Roe decisions are, in fact, compatriots. Both the Doe and Roe
courts foster the image of the homosexual parent not only as a dangerous
criminal, but also as the personification of the anti-family.
In Doe, the father had asserted that the mother's lesbian relationship was
a crime, which, as he urged, meant that she had forfeited her parental
rights.65 Although the Supreme Court of Virginia did not subscribe to the
"forfeiture" theory, it still went ahead and abided by that perception of
lesbianism as a form of dangerous criminality:
If we follow [the father's] . . . argument to its logical
conclusion, we soon would be considering whether a convicted
murderer, rapist, robber, burglar, habitual offender, or some
other lawbreaker, whose conduct is unlawful and whose life-
style is dangerous to himself, his family, and the public
generally, should be declared unfit per se as a parent and his
children made fair targets for adoption.66
Such a likening of homosexuality to criminality is also a central feature of
the Roe analysis. The Roe court reiterated the mother's assertion that "the
conduct inherent in the father's relationship is punishable as a class six felony"
64. Id. Although the Roe court distinguished Doe on the basis that Doe was not a custody dispute but
an adoption, at least one court apparently viewed Doe differently. In Doe v. Doe, 660 F.2d 101, 106 (4th
Cir. 1981), the same Jane Doe filed a habeas corpus petition, alleging that the detention of the child was
unlawful. The federal appellate court referred to the Doe matter as a "purely custodial case between private
parties" and thus, deemed it one in which it was inappropriate for federal courts to intervene. Id. at 104.
65. Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 805 (1981). Anti-sodomy laws exist in nearly half the states. See
Pershing, supra note 13, at 293 n.13; Russman, supra note 7, at 52. Virginia, like most states, defines
sodomy as oral or anal sexual penetration and does not specify the gender of the partners. Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-361 (Michie Supp. 1993). Pershing points out:
Studies show that more than ninety percent of heterosexual couples, married and unmarried,
engage in oral sex in their own boudoirs. Thus, if a court deprives a lesbian or gay natural
parent of custody of her or his child based on an assumed violation of a gender-neutral sodomy
or other sexual conduct proscription, social science fact requires a similar finding of unsuitability
as to any rival for custody regardless of that person's gender or sexual orientation, who does
not first certify abstinence from the sexual activity in question.
Pershing, supra note 13, at 295.
66. 284 S.E.2d at 805.
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and one "prosecuted with considerable frequency and vigor."67 The court
seemed to think that the child's life with her gay father, tantamount to being
exposed to unlawful or illicit acts, is like a fixed and continuous injection with
a toxic substance.68
In this respect, both Doe and Roe have a haunting analogue in Bowers v.
Hardwick.69 The Bowers Court distinguished homosexual sodomy in the home
from the viewing of obscenity in the home, which was recognized as a
legitimate privacy interest in Stanley v. Georgia,70 which involved the
viewing of obscenity in the home.7" There, the Bowers Court associated
homosexual sodomy with the possession of stolen goods or drugs and to the
ownership of potentially deadly firearms.72 Thus, the courts in Doe and Roe,
as in Bowers, relegated homosexuality to the broad rubric of dangerous
criminality.
The judicial portrait of homosexuality harks back to what was a rather
unwieldy distinction between crimes malum prohibita and those mala in se.73
According to Blackstone, one guilty of a crime malum in se has offended
"those rights then which God and nature have established."" A crime malwn
prohibitum, however, "enjoin[s] only positive duties, and forbid[s] only such
things as are not mala in se . . .without any intermixture of moral guilt."'
Although concededly difficult to ascribe precise definitions to the two
categories, the malum in se crime typically encompasses something inherently
67. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
68. Id.
69. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
70. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
71. In Stanley, the Supreme Court stated:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds.
Id. at 565.
72. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986), the Court rejected Hardwick's assertion that
the result should be different where the homosexual conduct occurs in the home. The Bowers Court,
conceding that "Stanley did protect conduct that would not have been protected outside the home," denied
that Stanley had any real ramifications outside of the contours of the First Amendment. Id.
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined, authored the primary
dissenting opinion. The dissenters underscored the fact that the forbidden conduct occurred in Hardwick's
home, "a place to which the Fourth Amendment attaches special significance," and criticized the Court's
narrowing of Stanley and called it "entirely unconvincing." Id. at 206-7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(b) (2d ed.
1986)(describing difference between malum in se and nalum prohibitum); As LaFave and Scott note, id.
1.6(b), at 32 n.21, "[a] leading case defining these terms is State v. Horton, 51 S.E. 9451, 9461 (1905):
'An offense malum in se is properly defined as one which is naturally evil as adjudged by the sense of a
civilized community, whereas an act malum prohibitum is wrong only because made so by statute.'"; see
also David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 451-52 n.31 (1986) (reviewing history of
distinction between malum in se and malum prohibitum).
74. EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE 16 (1959).
75. Id. at 19.
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evil or conduct involving moral turpitude.76 Unlawful acts that imperil life
or limb tend to fall into the malum in se class. 7
In cases involving the parental rights of homosexuals, courts typically
reason in two non-sequential steps: first, they automatically yoke the sexual
preference with the act of sodomy 7 and second, they infuse the same-sex love
relationship with malum in se import. The culmination of such reasoning is
an unquestioning convergence of a legal concept of crime with religious
notions about transgressions against God. 79  Thus, the homosexual, as
judicially processed, ceases to be an individual and instead transmutes into a
symbol-one of the malum in se criminal sinner. Consequently, when lesbians
and gay men are parties in non-criminal cases involving their parental rights
or child custody, many judges do not see them as parents-or even as people.
What they see before them are criminals and not just average lawbreakers, but
faceless forms charged and already convicted of inherently wicked crimes.
As part of an argument that a parent's sexual orientation should not be the
sole basis for determining child custody, Stephen B. Pershing isolates the
"supposed ills" that courts often assert an interest in combatting when they try
to justify their use of sexual orientation as a criterion for determining parental
fitness.80 Pershing posits that neither rationale, the "supposed 'illegality' of
the parent's conduct" or the immorality of the parent's lifestyle, is "self-
sustaining, but each subsists on an underlying bias against homosexuality in
and of itself. "8
76. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 73 §1.6(b), at 33, citing In re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969, 971 (Utah
1943); Richard A. Weinberg, Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Obscenity Prosecutions: A Sixth
Amendment Analysis for a First Amendment Problem, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1311, 1324-25 & n. 105
(1982). LaFave and Scott point out that "[tlhe trouble is that 'moral turpitude' is just as vague an
expression as 'malum in se,' so it helps very little to define one term by reference to the other." Id. at
n.25.
77. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 73, § 1.6(b) & n.26 ("In Dixon v. State, 104 Miss. 410, 61
So. 423 (1913), the court classified carrying a concealed weapon, public drunkenness and public shooting
as mala prohibita because they were 'not per se vicious or dangerous.'").
78. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court examined a law "against sodomy between consenting adults
in general" and treats it as applying just to "homosexual sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. This too is
a homophobic reaction, one which treats homosexuality and sodomy as synonyms. See the excellent analysis
in Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA.
L. REV. 1721, 1726 (1993) (Bowers Court portrays "sodomy as transhistorically stable and identical to
homosexual identity").
79. Cf. LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 73, §1.6(b) n.22 (distinction between mala in se and mala
prohibita "may have originated even earlier in the area of ecclesiastical law: a priest who commits a wrong
malum in se should be unfrocked; not so with a wrong only malum prohibitum"); Fried, supra note 73,
at 451 n. 31 (tracing history of malum in se). In Bowers v.Hardwick, the Court intimated that the sodomist
is and has always been viewed as a sinner, and traced the proscriptions against homosexual sodomy to
"ancient roots." 478 U.S. at 192. But see J. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE AND
HOMOSEXUALITY 61-206 (1980); Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1086-87
(1988) (questioning prevalence of supposed "ancient" prohibitions upon which Bowers court relied); Halley,
supra note 78, at 1751 n.91 (challenging claims made in historical survey relied on by Bowers Court).
80. Pershing, supra note 13, at 291-292.
81. Id. at 292.
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Pershing is, of course, correct that illegality and immorality as distinct
bases for denying a right to a homosexual derive from "aversions to gay and
lesbian persons. "82 But the judicial proclivity to fuse illegality and
immorality into a composite basis for treating homosexuals differently solely
because of their sexual preference is even more insidiously biased. That is,
the malum in se assumption or the fusion of the unlawful with the sinful creates
a homogenous identity for the homosexual. Such an identity does not just
derive from, but actually sustains bias and spawns more prejudice.
The concept of homosexuality as a dangerous crime surfaces in another
way in Doe. The Doe court specifically stated that "in determining [Jane's]
fitness as a mother and the future welfare of her son, we are not unmindful
of her testimony that should it become necessary, for her son's sake, she
would sever the relationship with the woman with whom she now lives."83
In essence, the Doe court clarified that the lesbian mother is rewarded for what
the court wants to see as her acknowledged willingness to change and for what
it wishes to believe is her ability to change.
Significantly, this is the way that the Doe court implicitly paid homage to
the lesbian mother for her reinforcement of the view of sexual preference as
something that is not immutable or as something that she can control.8 4 The
mother has thus, in the court's view, substantiated what is one of the bases for
declining to treat homosexuals as a suspect class-namely, that the trait is
neither immutable nor determined by causes outside of the individual's
control. "
82. Id.
83. Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981).
84. In Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), a three judge panel concluded that
homosexuals are suspect class. Judge Norris wrote:
[W]e have no trouble concluding that sexual orientation is immutable for the purposes
of equal protection doctrine. Although the causes of homosexuality are not fully
understood, scientific research indicates that we have little control over our sexual
orientation and that, once acquired, our sexual orientation is largely impervious to
change. . . . [Aillowing the government to penalize the failure to change such a
central aspect of individual and group identity would be abhorrent to the values
animating the constitutional ideal of equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 1347-48. In an en banc hearing in Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), the court
deemed the Army estopped from preventing Watkins' reenlistment solely on the basis of his sexual
preference and thus concluded that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional questions that it had
addressed in its earlier decision. But cf Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989)
(homosexuals not suspect or quasi-suspect class); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(classifications based upon sexual orientation not subject to strict scrutiny).
85. One of the arguments that homosexuals meet the criteria for a suspect class is that they "share
an immutable characteristic that bears no relation to their ability to participate in society." Russman, supra
note 7, at 63. See also Beverly A. Uhl, A New Issue in Foster Parenting-Gays, 25 J. FAM. L. 577, 594
(1986-87) (homosexual trait is not in control of individual).
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That is, Jane, portrayed as a sinner who can repent or as a criminal that
can reform,86 does not lose the child because she has announced that she will
and can relinquish what is purportedly just her life-style for her child.
In fact, courts that condition custody or visitation on the gay or lesbian
parent refraining from certain conduct are also adhering to the belief that
sexual orientation, like criminal conduct, is something that can be modified
or reformed. 7 The parents who comply (or indicate a willingness or ability
to comply) with such restrictive orders are rewarded, not just for their
particular modification or reform, but for their implicit bolstering of one of
the prevalent arguments against the immutability factor. The Roe court, which
ultimately treated the father as incapable of parting with his supposedly
miscreant ways,8" implicitly endorsed the understanding of sexual orientation
as an immutable trait, which thus can be worthy of suspect classification status.
As such, the paradox is that within what appears to be the harsher unequal
treatment of the homosexual parent resides a perspective actually more
congenial to ultimate constitutional equal protection. 9
What exacerbates the image of the dangerous malum in se criminal is its
coexistence with another separate judicial tendency, the refusal to attribute
familial attributes to the homosexual household. In Doe, the heterosexual father
depicted his own home as a "'rural extended family'" and juxtaposed it with
that of his ex-wife, which was "different, unordered, unstructured, and
bohemian." 90 While the lesbian mother spoke of herself as "'married'" and
said that she and her lover were quite committed to each other,9 ' the court,
implicitly acquiescing in the father's perspective, refrained from denominating
that bond as a "marriage" or as "marital" and instead clung to more sterile
terms, like "relationship" and "association."92
Further, the Doe court metonymically described the dispute before it as
one between "two households, one where there is a husband and wife
86. Significantly, one of the basic themes that pervades the criminal justice system (except in certain
death penalty cases) is a purported belief in the possibility of rehabilitation and the hope of restoring the
convict to some respected and useful position in society. Courts, adhering to their view of the gay man
or lesbian as a criminal, implicitly take comfort in the reassuring suggestion that homosexuality is likewise
subject to rehabilitation.
87. For some homosexual parents, conditional or restrictive orders have serious economic
ramifications. See Suseoff, supra note 8, at 868 ("For a single mother with children, whose former
husband has shown his open hostility by challenging her custody rights rather than participating in a
negotiated joint custody arrangement, the financial burden of maintaining a household separate from her
lover's can be profound.").
88. In Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693, the trial court had granted the father's custody on the condition that
he not share the same bed or bedroom with any other male while the child was present. The Supreme Court
of Virginia, however, was not persuaded that this restriction would prevent the father's alleged negative
influence. Apparently, the Supreme Court of Virginia believed that the father simply could not control his
conduct. Id. at 694.
89. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process & Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1178 (1988) (Bowers leaves open the issue
of whether equal protection prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
90. Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 801.
91. Id. at 802.
92. Id. at 802-7.
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relationship and the other a homosexual relationship between two women."93
The implication is that this controversy is not one between human beings but
between households, and that such households are not simply options of equal
valence, but antipodal. A choice to award custody to the lesbian mother would
force the child to drop from the pinnacle, the traditional hearth of the "rural
heterosexual family relationship," to the abyss-namely, "the life-style
practiced by [the] mother. " 9' In the Doe court's perspective, the man and
woman comprised a family, but the women were not merely not family, but
did not even have or live a life-style. As such, the two women merely
practiced a life-style. Thus, even though the Doe court said that it would not
hold that every lesbian mother or homosexual father is per se an unfit parent,
it adhered to an assumption that the mother's life-style was "unnatural" and
"unorthodox," and factored that into its consideration of her fitness as a
mother and of what is in the best interest of the child. 95
The way the Roe court pitted the homosexual household against the family
home as polar opposites was through a fixation on the bed and bedroom that
the father shared with his male lover. The trial court's attempted eviction of
the father from that bedroom ensued from an underlying revulsion at having
marital insignia in what the court saw as an absolutely non-marital or even
anti-marital arena. Also, the Roe court declined to treat the hugging and
patting96 in the father's house as displays of love and affection, but instead
adopted the mother's characterization of that conduct into something toxically
aberrant and the child's exposure to it as unquestionably "deleterious."9 In
the Roe opinion, the father's house, frequented by other homosexuals, appears
not as a home, but as some orgiastic situs.98
II. THE MALUM IN SE ANTI-FAMILIAL CRIMINAL IN BOTTOMS
A. Bottoms in the Trial Court
When Sharon Bottoms separated from her husband, she was pregnant with
their son. The divorce decree awarded custody of the child to Sharon and the
93. Id. at 802.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 806.
96. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 693.
97. Id. at 694.
98. The predominant stereotype of a "gay life-style," is a life-style characterized by indulgence in
promiscuous sexual activity. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office,
668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1987). As the court in High Tech Gays stated:
Many people erroneously believe that the sexual experience of lesbians and gay men
represents the gratification of purely prurient interests, not the expression of mutual
affection and love. They fail to recognize that gay people seek and engage in stable,
monogamous relationships. Instead, to many, the very existence of lesbians and gay
men is inimical to the family.
Id. See also discussion in Dooley, supra note 12, at 403-04.
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child's father never became actively involved in his son's life. For about three
years after the divorce, Ms. Bottoms dated another man, lived with her cousin
and then lived with two lesbians. Eventually, Sharon began living with a
female lover, April Wade.
During the time Sharon Bottoms had legal custody, she often relied on her
mother, Kay Bottoms, to care for her child. In fact, according to Kay, she was
the one who took care of the child the most.99 At a certain point, however,
Sharon told her mother that her son would be spending less time at her
mother's house because of the male companion living there. At that time,
Sharon explained that while she was growing up, this same live-in companion
had sexually abused her over eight hundred times. Although the grandmother
initially expressed shock at these accusations, she later concluded that her
daughter's charges were "not altogether unfounded." "
The grandmother nevertheless sued for custody of her grandson. In
compliance with her lawyer's advice, the grandmother had her live-in
companion move out of the house during the pendency of the custody dispute.
The main thrust of the custody petition was that Sharon's sexually active
lesbian relationship made her an unfit parent.
Sharon Bottoms admitted that she was a lesbian and that she lived with her
female lover. She also said that she and her lover had consensual sex in the
privacy of their residence. Specifically, she explained that "they share[d] the
same bed and engage[d] in oral sex once or twice a week."'' Also, when
her child was very young, his crib was stationed in the bedroom. Sharon,
however, testified that she and her lover had never engaged in any type of
sexual activity in her son's presence, but that they had displayed affection for
each other openly by hugging and kissing and by patting one another on the
bottom.
At trial, the psychological evidence showed that Sharon Bottoms'
relationship with her lover had "no visible or discernible effect" on her
son."° Also, evaluations described Sharon as "warm" and "responsive" with
her child and the child as "entirely secure and at ease with his mother." 103
Moreover, Kay Bottoms was unable to show that Sharon had failed to provide
her son adequately with the basic necessities of life. Apparently, Sharon had
twice spanked the child too hard, but this had not bruised or injured him. Also,
Sharon had once punished her son by making him stand in the corner and had
on occasion cursed in front of the child. The trial court was also aware that
Sharon's lover was a recovering alcoholic.
Kay Bottoms testified that once her daughter had left the child with her for
a week without telling her how she could be reached. There was no showing,
99. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 278 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)






however, that Sharon had ever left her son unattended. The evidence also
showed that Sharon Bottoms had recently obtained employment and was
receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Sharon's ex-husband,
however, paid no child support whatsoever.
In finding that Sharon Bottoms was "an unfit parent as a matter of
law," 104 the trial court stated:
Sharon Bottoms has . . . admitted . . . that she is living in a
homosexual relationship. . . . She is sharing . . . her bed with
• . . her female lover. . . . Examples given were kissing,
patting, all of this in the presence of the child.. . . There is no
case directly on point concerning all these matters. In the case
of Roe v. Roe, it's certainly of assistance to me in reaching a
decision here today. I will tell you first that the mother's
conduct is illegal. . . . I will tell you that it is the opinion of
the court that her conduct is immoral. And it is the opinion of
this court that the conduct of Sharon Bottoms renders her an
unfit parent. However, I also must recognize and do recognize,
that there is a presumption in the law in favor of the custody
being with the natural parent. And I then ask myself are Sharon
Bottoms' circumstances of unfitness . . . of such an
extraordinary nature as to rebut this presumption. My answer
to this is yes [under] Roe v. Roe. 105
The trial court granted custody to Kay Bottoms and gave Sharon the right
to visit the child two days a week. The court, moreover, prohibited such
parental visits to occur either in the home that Sharon Bottoms shared with her
lover or in the presence of the lover.
B. Bottoms in the Court of Appeals
The Virginia court of appeals was obliged to accord "great deference to
the trial court's custody determination" and to presume that a "child's best
interests will be served when in the custody of its [natural] parent. "106
Because of the maxim on which the presumption was based-that "the
relationship between a child and its parent is one of the most jealously
protected rights in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, "-the only way the
grandmother could prevail was to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
104. Id.
105. Id. at 279-80 (omissions by the appellate court).
106. Boroms, 444 S.E.2d at 280 (quoting Judd v. Van Horn, 81 S.E.2d 432, 436 (Va. 1954)).
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her daughter was "unfit or that special circumstances g[a]ve an extraordinary
reason for a transfer of custody."107
Because the custody dispute was not one between the natural parents, but
instead had a third party attempting to divest custody from a natural parent,
Sharon enjoyed a presumption of parental fitness. In fact, the grandmother had
to rebut that presumption before the court could even engage in the second tier
of the analysis-whether the grandmother would herself be a fit or proper
custodian. The court elaborated on this:
Unfortunately, and all too frequently, foster parents or third
parties would be more willing and better able to provide a
loving and nurturing environment for a child than would the
child's parents; however, custody of a child may not be taken
from a parent on that basis. Even when the parental level of
care may be marginally satisfactory, courts may not take
custody of a child from his or her parents simply because a
third party may be willing and able to provide better care for
the child.'o8
The court, reviewing the most arguably damaging evidence against Sharon
Bottoms, summed up that "on two occasions she [had] spanked her son 'too
hard,' on occasion she [had] swor[n] in his presence, she had him stand in a
corner, and on occasion she had failed to change his diaper as soon as
conditions required."° The appellate court nevertheless concluded that there
was no credible evidence to prove that Sharon was unfit or that her retaining
custody would harm the child physically or psychologically."'
In addition, the court noted other aspects of Sharon's life after her
separation from her husband-namely, that she had had four different
residences in different relationships in a three year period and had not
maintained regular employment. The court acknowledged the fact that Sharon
had left her son for a week with Kay, his grandmother, without telling Kay
how she could be reached. The court concluded that, although an examination
of such charges against Sharon showed that her parenting was not perfect, she
was neither abusive nor indifferent to her child's well-being."'
107. Id. But see Richards, supra note 6, at 735 (discussing natural parent preference and suggesting
.a new approach .. . that preserves the judicial economy of the natural parent preference, but only to the
extent that it is consistent with the child's best interest."); Eric P. Salthe, Note, Would Abolishing the
Natural Parent Preference In Custody Disputes Be In Everyone's Best Interest?, 29 J. FAM. L. 539 (199 1)
(concluding that courts should rely on "best interests of child" standard rather than natural parent preference
in custody disputes).
108. 444 S.E.2d at 280 (citing Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 200 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 1973)). In some
states, the natural parent preference is codified. See Richards, supra note 6, at 737 n.7.





Further, the intermediate appellate court rejected the trial court's finding
of parental unfitness on the basis of Sharon's lesbian relationship and on the
basis of her engagement in the illegal act of sodomy.'12 As the court viewed
it, the relationship between a parent and resident of the household are "critical
and significant" factors, which indeed bear on the issue of parental fitness and
on what is in the best interest of the child. "3 While the court, abided by the
state supreme court's view that a "lesbian 'lifestyle' is one factor 'to [be] ..
. considered in determining [a woman's] fitness as a mother,'" it reiterated that
a parent's sexual preference does not "per se render a parent unfit to have
custody of his or her child."" 4 Thus, as the appellate court put it:
A court may not simply surmise, speculate, or take notice that
because a parent engages in private, sexual conduct, even that
which is illegal or conduct that is perceived by some as
immoral or antisocial and to which the child is not subjected
and which does not affect the child, the parent is unfit or the
child is being harmed."'
In confronting the issue of illegality, the court dealt with three cases in
which third parties had sought to usurp parental custody and treated them as
analogues. In Mason v. Moon," 6 a grandmother also had sought to obtain
custody of a child from the parent. The appellate court, however, had
concluded that the grandparent did not present clear and convincing evidence
to show that living in a residence with a stepfather, who had killed the child's
father in her presence, would harm the child." 7 In Ferris v. Underwood,""
the problem was that the mother's sister, who was a prostitute, frequented the
home where the child lived. The Ferris court deemed the evidence to be
insufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of the natural parent." 9 Also,
in Phillips v. Kiraly, 20 the court found that the aunt and uncle had likewise
failed to rebut the same parental presumption where the father, who was shown
to be irresponsible, was accused of having taken pictures of nude women,
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1981)).
115. Id. at 282 (citing Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 805).
116. 385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. App. 1989).
117. Id. at 245-46. Dissenting Judge Baker stated:
1wihether the child witnessed criminal homicide or merely the death of her father at
Billy Robert's hands, the trial court was justified in believing that the risk of an
adverse psychological effect on the child was too great to place the child in a home
with Billy Robert.
Id. at 246.
118. 348 S.E.2d 18 (Va. App. 1986).
119. Id. at 20. The Ferris court based its holding, in part, on the fact that "Itihere [wasi no evidence
in the record ... that the mother's sister engaged in prostitution in [the mother's] home or that the situation
in any way affected the child." Id.
120. 105 S.E.2d 855 (Va. 1958).
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having issued bad checks, and being a "Peeping Tom." 2 ' Aligning Bottoms
with Mason, Ferris and Phillips, the court proclaimed that "[elven when a
natural parent falls short of society's accepted standards of behavior," the State
will not remove a child from a parent without proof of harm or evidence of
neglect or abuse.122
The appellate court also said that the trial court had misapplied the
Supreme Court decision in Roe. Roe, as the court pointed out, did not mandate
a per se approach to such custodial disputes. In fact, as the Bottoms court saw
it, the Roe court had declined to hold that every homosexual parent is per se
unfit. The Bottoms court, narrowing Roe, stated that what made the Roe father
an "unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law" was his "continuous
exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship."" 2  Finally,
the Bottoms court distinguished Roe from the matter before it on the basis that
Roe was a fight between two parents-not one between a parent and a third
party. Thus, because that presumption of parental fitness did not shield the
father in Roe, the Bottoms court deemed the Roe decision to be inapposite.
Although the Bottoms court saw a similarity between Sharon Bottoms' open
display of affection toward her lover in the presence of the child and the
father's unconcealed conduct in Roe, it viewed the Roe disclosure as somehow
more egregious and as harmful to the child. Specifically, as the Bottoms court
emphasized, in Roe the nine-year old daughter had "witnessed [her father and
another man] 'hugging and kissing and sleeping in bed together'" and had seen
"other homosexuals .. . 'engage in similar behavior'" at her father's house
parties and all of this had "visibly distressed" her.'24 In the Bottoms case,
however, there was neither a showing that the lovers engaged in "illegal sexual
behavior" in front of the child nor evidence that the child had or would suffer
because of the relationship. 121
C. Bottoms in the Supreme Court of Virginia
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed.' 26 Although the supreme court
acknowledged the strong presumption favoring a parent over a non-parent, it
121. Id. at 857.
122. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 282.
123. Id. at 283 (citing Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 727).
124. Id. (quoting Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 692).
125. Id. at 283. In a footnote near the end of the decision, the Bottoms court disposed of two cases,
in which grandparents had obtained custody apparently because factors, other than the sexual preference
of the mother, established parental unfitness. In McGinnis v. McGinnis, 567 So. 2d 390 (Ala. Civ. App.
1990), the lesbian mother had herself expressly and voluntarily relinquished custody and had used illegal
drugs in the home. In White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1990), the mother had used marijuana
when the children were home, left them often without supervision and allegedly failed to clothe them
properly during the colder months. The Bottoms court said that the case before it did not present the same
kind of "relinquishment and dereliction of basic parental responsibility" upon which it believed that the
Alabama and Mississippi courts had predicated their decisions. 444 S.E.2d at 284 n.3.
126. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
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emphasized that "clear and convincing evidence" of parental unfitness can
rebut that presumption.' 27 It further recited the admonitory bromide that "[a]
reviewing court should never redetermine the facts on appeal."' 28 Then,
suturing together both tenets, the supreme court stated:
The evidence plainly is sufficient, when applying the clear and
convincing standard and when viewing the facts from the
correct appellate perspective, to support the trial court's
findings that the parental presumption has been rebutted, that
the mother is an unfit custodian at this time, and that the child's
best interests would be promoted by awarding custody to the
grandmother. 9
While the supreme court cited its decision in Doe for the proposition that
homosexuality does not render a parent per se unfit and said that the felonious
"conduct inherent in lesbianism" is a consideration in determining custody,
it focused almost exclusively (and indeed excessively) on factors other than
those of sexual preference. 3' Rather, the supreme court described Sharon
Bottoms as "disappear[ing] for days without informing the child's custodian
of her whereabouts," as "mov[ing] her residence from place to place," as
"relying on others for support," and as "us[ing] welfare funds to 'do' her
fingernails before buying food for the child."
131
The court also dwelled on her promiscuity in her heterosexual past, which
it grouped together under the title "illicit relationships with numerous men,"
and emphasized her acquisition of venereal disease from one such tryst. 1
32
Further, the court collected various details about Sharon Bottoms'
imperfections as a mother, which include the fact that she once forcefully
struck the child and that she had been dilatory with respect to diaper changing.
The supreme court found that there was "proof . . . that the child ha[d]
been harmed" because the child used "vile language," had temper tantrums
and appeared "confused about efforts at discipline." 3 3  After the seemingly
studious effort to avoid mentioning issues related to sexual preference, the
court, repeating language from Roe, pronounced that active lesbianism
can-and likely will-create "social condemnation" and thus disturb the child's
relationships with "peers and the community at large."1 34  The possibility
127. Id. at 104.
128. Id. at 105.
129. Id.




134. Id. (quoting Roe, 324 S.E.2d. at 694). There are, of course, decisions in which courts decline
to treat social prejudices as grounds for the denial of custody. In Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court determined that potential societal condemnation resulting from an
interracial marriage did not warrant the denial of child custody to the mother. In so doing, the Court refused
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of social condemnation-and the decision of an independent guardian ad
litem-cemented the court's decision to deny custody to Sharon Bottoms.
135
The three dissenters, however, had several serious quarrels with the court's
decision. They objected to the majority's failure to see that the trial court had
refused to follow "established law" by its arriving at a "per se finding of
unfitness based on the mother's homosexual conduct." 3' Also, they indicted
the majority for "presum[ing] that its own perception of societal opinion and
the mother's homosexual conduct are germane to the issue whether the mother
is an unfit parent" because such adverse affects must be and were not actually
shown. 137 The dissenters, however, did not advocate a blanket affirmance.
They instead urged a remand to the trier of fact for "application of the correct
principles of law to all the evidence." 1'
D. The Malum in Se Anti-Familial Criminal
The intermediate appellate court decision in Bottoms excited applause from
gay activists, who praised it as a "major symbolic victory for gay rights
organizations and [a] set back [for] conservative groups defending their views
of the traditional family. "131 In fact, the Washington-based National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force rejoiced in the ruling, which to them "sen[t] a message
nationally that sexual orientation has no relevance to the ability to parent a
child."" Similarly, Paula Bantner of the National Center for Lesbian Rights
in San Francisco described the decision as a "strong message that just because
a woman is a lesbian, it does not make her an unfit mother."' 4 '
Much of the celebration of the court of appeals' decision in Bottoms stems
from an infatuation with merely the judgment, which reunited mother and son.
The bleak truth, however, is that en route to that happy ending, the court of
appeals, had, in effect, perpetuated the cruel stereotype of the homosexual as
anti-familial and as a malum in se criminal. The supreme court majority
approach is really not so different from the decision it reversed. Specifically,
the supreme court ultimately made explicit what was implicit in the reasoning
of the court below.
to "directly or indirectly give [other peoples' biases] effect" and said that "[tihe Constitution cannot control
such prejudices, but neither can it tolerate them." Id. at 433. In M.A.B. v. R.B., 134 Misc. 2d 317, 324-
25 (1986), the New York court, relying on Palmore, declined to deprive a gay father of custody of his
son. That court, however, acknowledged that it would require strength for the boy to contend with the kind
of stress caused by societal condemnation of his father's sexual orientation. Id. at 323. See also M.P. v.
S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (1979) (holding that potential societal stigma did not merit a denial of custody to
lesbian mother).
135. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 106-07 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 109.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Court Grants Lesbian Mother Custody of Her 2-Year Old Son, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at
2A.




1. The Malum In Se Criminal
Stephen B. Pershing, who was one of Sharon Bottoms' attorneys, isolates
the "flaws in some common rationales for anti-gay custody
determinations."' 42  What Pershing points out is that courts use the
"supposed 'illegality' of homosexual relations as ammunition against gay or
lesbian couples."143 While the illegality basis, of course, ensues from state
statutes which criminalized "sodomy," such statutes typically define "sodomy"
as an act of oral or anal sexual penetration and do not specify the gender or
sexual preference of the offenders.' The judicial incantation of the word
"illegality" as the rationale for denying custody to a homosexual parent is
disturbing not just because it spawns an unjustified "disparate treatment of
heterosexual and homosexual parents in custody disputes,"' 45 but also
because it transforms the act of sodomy into the shibboleth of same-sex love
and simultaneously fuses same-sex love with a broad substantive subject in
law-crime.
That triad of sodomy, homosexuality, and crime, also surfaces in Bowers
v. Hardwick." Although the Bowers Court initially described the Georgia
sodomy statute as a "law against sodomy between consenting adults in
general," it sub silentio excised heterosexuals from the proscription by
narrowing the issue before it to whether "the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. ""' Thus, the
Bowers Court, through viewing "sodomy as transhistorically stable and
identical to homosexual identity,"' 48 coterminously gave the homosexual an
identity as a sodomist criminal.
In the court of appeals decision in Bottoms, the coalescence of sodomy,
homosexuality, and crime also manifests itself, but does so in three different
ways. First, the image of the criminal sodomist is the only aspect of the trial
court's findings that the appellate court condoned. In determining that Sharon
Bottoms was an "unfit parent,"' 49 the trial court did not even purport to
articulate its views in a temperately judicial manner: rather, the judge's words
became quite personal and staccato and even bordered on hysteria. His
proclamation, "I will tell you first that the mother's conduct is illegal ...
I will tell you that it is the opinion of the court that her conduct is
142. Pershing, supra note 13, at 291.
143. Id. at 292.
144. See Pershing, supra note 13 (discussing how the use of illegality as a basis for removing a child
from a homosexual parent presents equal protection problems). See also supra note 65.
145. Pershing, supra note 13, at 295.
146. 478 U.S. 186 (1985).
147. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
148. Halley, supra note 78, at 1726.
149. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 279.
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immoral,"150 is a personal outright denunciation of Sharon Bottoms as the
epitome of the immoral malum in se lawbreaker.' 5'
While the intermediate appellate court rejected the decision below, what
it did put its imprimatur on was the trial court's portrayal of Sharon Bottoms
as the malum in se criminal. In fact, the court stated that "in this instance, the
open lesbian relationship and illegality of the mother's sexual activity are the
only significant factors that the court considered in finding Sharon Bottoms to
be an unfit parent." 52 That is, the court of appeals exempted the illegality
aspect from what would otherwise be its blanket disapproval of the analysis
below.
Second, lesbianism congeals with criminality through the intermediate
appellate court's abrupt leap from the topic of sexual preference to crime:
[Tihe fact that a mother is a lesbian and has engaged in illegal
sexual acts does not alone justify taking custody of a child from
her and awarding the child to a non-parent, even though an
award of custody may be only temporary. The fact that a parent
has committed a crime does not render a parent unfit, unless
such criminal conduct impacts upon or is harmful to the child,
or unless other special circumstances exist aside from the
parent's conduct that would render continued custody with the
parent deleterious to the child. 53
That transitionless jolt from lesbianism, which purportedly does not "per se
render a parent unfit,"' 54 to the hypothetical of the criminal parent is really
a way of collapsing together two disparate concepts.
Third, the court of appeals strengthened that union of sexual preference
and crime through effectually aligning the Bottoms case with cases, like Ferris
v. Underwood,' Phillips v. Kiraly,156 Mason v. Moon 57 and Walker
v. Fagg,58 in which courts allowed children to remain with parents that had
either themselves been charged with or convicted of crimes or allowed
criminals into their homes. In Ferris, the "most troublesome evidence" was
that the mother's sister was a prostitute who sometimes visited the custodial
home. 159 Through its treatment of Ferris as an analogue, the Bottoms Court
150. Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, the trial judge in Bottoms had such an extreme aversion to
lesbianism that he preferred the grandmother as the custodian of the child, even though that grandmother
had had a live-in lover who had apparently sexually abused her own child.
151. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
152. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d at 281 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 281-82.
154. Id. at 281.
155. 348 S.E.2d 18 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
156. 105 S.E.2d 855 (Va. Ct. App. 1958).
157. 385 S.E.2d 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
158. 400 S.E.2d 208 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
159. 348 S.E.2d at 20.
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implicitly forged a bond between a child's exposure to prostitution and
exposure to a same-sex couple.
In Phillips, after the father had placed his daughter in the temporary
custody of his deceased wife's sister, the sister refused to return the child. As
part of their case against the father, the custodians showed not only that he had
issued bad checks, but also that he took pictures of nude women and had been
"engaged in a so-called 'Peeping-Tom' episode."160 In the Bottoms court
of appeals' reliance on Phillips, there is an implied link between the lesbian
mother's life-style to one of dishonesty and voyeuristic aberration.
Through connecting the Bottoms matter to the situations in Mason and
Walker, the court of appeals equated lesbianism with actual episodes of
violence. In Mason, the child had witnessed the stepfather killing her own
father. In Walker, the father had not only neglected his children and abused
alcohol, but had actually been convicted of killing his wife.
As such, through use of Ferris, Phillips, Mason, and Walker as a
precedential quartet, the Bottoms court of appeals injected the lesbian factor
into a larger classification, one which subsumes prostitution, dishonesty,
voyeurism and violence. The approach, which atavistically alludes to the
malum in se classification,' is again reminiscent of that language in Bowers,
which equates homosexual sodomy in the home with the possession of stolen
goods or drugs and to the ownership of potentially deadly firearms. 162 Thus,
although the Bottoms court of appeals returned little Tyler to his mother, it,
in the spirit of Bowers, employed in its reasoning references to crime and
violence and made such references into a language for the discussion of sexual
preference.
The tripartite alloy composed of sodomy, homosexuality, and crime is
equally pronounced in the portrait that the Supreme Court of Virginia paints
of Sharon Bottoms. In its reasoning, the supreme court significantly avoided
use of the word "sodomy" and instead forged an automatic equation between
"conduct inherent in lesbianism" and "felony."' 63 That is, the court viewed
lesbianism and crime to be virtually interchangeable. Further, the supreme
court, in emphasizing the "social condemnation" that a child of an "active
lesbian" supposedly suffers, stigmatized the mother as a convict that has
extricated both herself and her child from "peers" and the "community at
large. "
164
In addition, the supreme court decision in Bottoms resembles the Doe
decision in one crucial aspect: namely, the judicial predilection for lesbianism
as something mutable. As we said, the Doe court clarified that the lesbian
mother was being rewarded for her acknowledged willingness to change and
160. 105 S.E.2d at 857.
161. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
162. 478 U.S. at 195. See also supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
163. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
164. Id. (quoting Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985)).
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for her professed ability to change.'65 That is, the Doe court implicitly paid
homage to the lesbian mother for her bolstering of their view of sexual
preference as something that is not immutable or as something that she could
control.'66 Significantly, in the court's perspective, the rewarded Doe
lesbian-like a criminal-could reform and be rehabilitated so that she could
once again join her peers and community.'67
In contrast, the supreme court punished Sharon Bottoms for her supposedly
demonstrated unwillingness to change and professed inability to change. The
supreme court especially noted that there was "evidence that the mother
separated herself from Wade after the juvenile court hearing . . . to
'help . . . with the custody fight,' but returned to live with her two weeks
later."6 8 The court further suggested that Sharon Bottoms would not live
apart from her lover even if it "would help her regain custody."169 What
troubled the court was that Sharon Bottoms' conduct apparently substantiated
the view of her sexual preference as something over which she had no control.
That is, she had implicitly defied being characterized as a sinner who can
repent or as a criminal who can reform.
Significantly, the supreme court recited what appears to be the guardian
ad litem's ultimatum "that custody is something that's flexible and can change
if the circumstances change." 7 ' The guardian's quoted statement that "at
this time under this actual situation," the child should live with the
grandmother, constitutes a near beseeching of Sharon Bottoms not to merely
relinquish her life of crime, but to prove that her sexual preference is a life
of crime that can be relinquished.' 7' That is, her corroboration of their
stereotype is what will bring her relief.
2. Anti-Family
The intermediate appellate court in Bottoms also fastidiously avoided
acknowledging that Sharon Bottoms' household was a home with family
attributes. This approach-one of pure denial-also mirrors an aspect of the
Bowers decision.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court had disavowed any relationship between the
"claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy" 17 2
and the privacy rights protected by Griswold v. Connecticut.'73 The Bowers
Court also rejected what the Eleventh Circuit had urged, that "[f]or some, the
165. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.




172. 478 U.S. at 191.
173. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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sexual activity in question . . . serves the same purpose as the intimacy of
marriage. " 174 In so doing, the Bowers Court extricated homosexual
relationships from a whole genre of marital and familial institutions. Mr.
Hardwick's relationship with other men had no connection with any sacred
institutions, like child rearing, marriage or procreation. As such, Mr.
Hardwick's "relationships" or "associations" were, by judicial fiat, figuratively
ousted from the familial hearth.
Another recent decision, Shahar v. Bowers,175 is also similar in this
respect. Even though Shahar married another woman and the Shahar court
went so far as to recognize Shahar's relationship with her lover as a
"constitutionally-protected intimate association," 176 it studiously eschewed
the word "marriage" and instead persisted in denominating Shahar's marriage
as a "relationship," an "association," an "intimacy."177
In the court of appeals' decision in Bottoms, the most blatant nullification
of anything conceivably marital or familial about Sharon Bottoms' love for
April Wade is the outright ouster of April Wade from the court's analysis of
the mother's parenting. From that Bottoms court, we learn that Sharon twice
"spanked her son 'too hard,'" on occasion "swore in his presence" and
neglected to promptly change his diaper."' The court of appeals disclosed
other details-how Sharon Bottoms punished her son by making him stand in
a corner and how she left her son with the grandmother "for a week without
informing the grandmother how she could be reached."179 Although that
court considered all sorts of intimate information in analyzing parental fitness
and explicitly recognized that the relationship between a parent and a resident
are "critical and significant" factors and although it is undisputed that April
Wade is indeed that very "critical and significant" resident, the court shut the
door on April Wade, thus keeping her out of the parental domicile.
Ironically, what makes April Wade's absence so glaring is that it is April
Wade's very presence in the custodial home that is the grandmother's main
basis for trying to have her daughter divested of custody. The intermediate
appellate court, however, did not appear to address how April Wade, as a
"critical" and "significant" member of the Bottoms' household, interacts with
or responds to the Bottoms' child. Such an exclusion of April Wade from an
174. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1212 (1lth Cir. 1985).
175. 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that although a homosexual relationship is an intimate
association protected by First Amendment, prospective employer's withdrawal of employment after learning
of plaintiff's homosexuality did not violate First Amendment or equal protection clause).
176. Id. at 863.
177. Id. at 863-69. In Shahar, when Shahar, a recent law school graduate, indicated that she wished
to marry another woman, the Attorney General withdrew his offer of employment. Consequently, Shahar
sued Bowers, asserting that the withdrawal of the offer was unconstitutional because it violated her rights
to freedom of association, freedom of religion, equal protection of the law, and substantive due process
of law. See generally Amy D. Ronner, Amathia and Denial of "In the Home" in Bowers v. Hardwick and
Shahar v. Bowers: Objective Correlatives and the Bacchae as Tools for Analyzing Privacy and Intimacy,
KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
178. 444 S.E.2d at 281.
179. Id.
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analysis of the parenting amounts to a denial that April Wade and Sharon
Bottoms do and can together comprise a parental home or a family. Really,
in the court of appeals' perspective, Sharon Bottoms is the same as a single
mother.
While the Supreme Court of Virginia did include April Wade in the
analysis, it used her to make the lesbian household even more anti-familial.
The house is portrayed not as a family unit, but more suggestively as a kind
of menage a trois with "the mother, the child and Wade ... living in a two-
bedroom apartment with 'Evelyn,' another lesbian." 8 ° The supreme court
intimated that the child's bed is the hub of the libidinous bedroom where "the
mother and Wade slept, having sex in the same bed." 8'
Also, rather than viewing Bottoms and Wade as comprising a family unit,
the supreme court treated them as a sham family where Wade had the audacity
to "become 'a parent figure' to the child" and where the child called Wade
"Da Da."' 82 While Wade comes across in the supreme court's decision as
an ersatz father, the court similarly faulted Sharon Bottoms for not being a real
mother by "refus[ing] to subordinate her own desires and priorities to the
child's welfare" and specifically, for putting her own manicure before baby
food. 8 3 That is, Sharon Bottoms has defied the expected image of maternal
self-sacrifice. Further, the supreme court sketched Wade as unstable and as
prone to "violence when her views were not accepted." 8 4 The cumulative
effect of the supreme court's choice to emphasize such detail is not one of a
warm sanctuary hearth, but of an orgiastic'85 explosive context within which
two women mock husband and wife and merely play house.
The lesbian domicile, as rendered by the supreme court, also takes on some
of the attributes of a bedouin tent. The court described Sharon Bottoms as
nomadic, as "disappear[ing] for days without informing the child's custodian
of her whereabouts," as "mov[ing] her residence from place to place, and as
keeping the "child's suitcase packed" to "aid in her mobility" so that she could
quickly deposit the child at her grandmother's.'86 The image is not one of
a home, but of near homelessness. Although the grandmother's home once
housed a child molester, the supreme court nevertheless unhesitantly
denominates it a "home" and ultimately pronounces it to be the "home."
180. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 106.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 108.
184. Id.
185. See supra note 98.




If courts are to play a role in eradicating discrimination based on sexual
orientation, they cannot focus their efforts merely on the judgments in the
particular cases before them. This Article examined three cases, Doe v.
Doe, "'87 Roe v. Roe, 8' and Bottoms v. Bottoms,"8 9 in which courts had
to decide the parental or custodial rights of homosexuals. Despite the fact that
in one of the three cases the homosexual parent ultimately prevailed, all three
decisions are equally homophobic. That is, all three perpetuate the same
damaging stereotypes about lesbians and gay men.
In Doe, the Supreme Court of Virginia declined to permanently deprive
a biological mother of her child solely because of that mother's lesbian
relationship where there was no showing that that relationship was detrimental
to the child. In Roe, however, the same court concluded that the gay father's
"continuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship" made
him an unfit custodian. 90 If one myopically scrutinizes just the results in Doe
and Roe, one might in all likelihood see the former as a victory and the latter
as a defeat. Both decisions, however, equally retard real change by effectually
divesting individuals of their individuality and homogenizing them into symbols
of malum in se criminality. This mythic identity of the homosexual derives
from the courts' triadic fusion of sexual preference with the act of sodomy,
and then with the disturbing abstraction of crime itself.
The Doe and Roe courts also meticulously refrained from attributing any
family qualities to the homosexual household. Although in Doe the mother
described her bond with her female lover as a marital commitment, the court
recoiled from such a characterization and instead resorted to the use of more
sterile labels, like "relationship" and "association." 19" ' Similarly, in Roe the
court made the father's house appear to be an orgiastic arena, a place unfit for
parenting. 92 That court also implicitly expressed revulsion at the bed that
the father shared with his male lover. Thus, a common denominator in Doe
and Roe is the judicial adherence to the view of the homosexual as not just a
malum in se criminal, but as something inimical to family.
In Bottoms, the ostensible lesbian victory in the intermediate appellate court
also harbored the icon of defeat. Although the Bottoms appeals court recited
that a parent's sexual preference does not "per se render a parent unfit to have
custody of his or her child,"' 93 it too wedded same-sex love with sodomy
and then affixed that union onto the malum in se concept. The Bottoms court
187. 284 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1981).
188. 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
189. 457 S.E.2d 102.
190. 324 S.E.2d at 694.
191. 284 S.E.2d at 802-07.
192. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
193. 444 S.E.2d at 281.
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of appeals' erasure of April Wade, Sharon's lover, from the parenting picture,
constituted its denial that the two women can comprise a marital or familial
unit. That is, while the court acknowledged that the relationship between the
parent and "resident" is a "critical and significant" factor in determining
parental fitness,' 94 that court, nevertheless, backed that very "resident" out
of the analysis. Again, the court of appeals decision in Bottoms, the short-lived
supposed lesbian victory, was, in essence, defeatingly discriminatory.
The bias and stereotypes that lurked beneath the court of appeals' decision
in Bottoms manifested itself in the supreme court's ultimate verdict of no
custody for Sharon Bottoms. According to the supreme court, the lesbian
mother is a diseased felon-the malum in se criminal-who, having sinned,
must lose her baby. The augmentation of her crime, however, is that she
refused to nourish the judicial misconception of sexual preference as mutable
and as in her control. She is portrayed as the stereotype who refuses to
reinforce the stereotype. She is, at once, the court's mythical creation that
simply will not cooperate with the myth.
In the supreme court's view, Sharon Bottom's life style is shifting and
unstable and devoid of a real mother and father. The apartment is not really
a home, but an orgiastic arena decked with packed suitcases. It is, as judicially
processed, not merely non-family, but anti-family. Herek's examination of the
different functions of homophobia'9 can help us understand what process
underlies such judicial reasoning in cases like Doe, Roe, and Bottoms.
According to Professor Herek, one function that homophobia serves is a
"defensive" one, which "stems from fear of one's own latent homosexuality,
or insecurity about one's sense of identity as a man or woman. "196 Herek
elaborates on defensiveness as a means of warding off anxiety:
It is sufficient to say that people can experience intense
conflicts between who they think they should be and who they
think they are. Sometimes these conflicts are based on having
homosexual desires that one cannot accept. Sometimes the
conflict involves feelings that one is not measuring up to one's
gender role; that a man does not feel like he is a 'real man' or
a woman that she is a 'real woman.' These conflicts cause
anxiety, a very unpleasant feeling that people try to avoid. One
strategy for avoiding anxiety is to deny that the unacceptable
feeling or characteristic is part of oneself, and to project it
outward onto some convenient person or object in the
environment. The person can then hate or fear that external
194. Id.
195. HEREK, supra note 2.
196. Id. at 931.
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object (which symbolizes some part of the self) without hating
or fearing herself. 197
The "defensive process" might also be churning within judicial decisions.
Courts, engaging in a "strategy" to deny that "unacceptable feeling[s] or
characteristic[s]" are part of themselves, react by projecting them "outward
onto some convenient person or object in the environment."' 98 Their
surrogate is objectified as the image of the homosexual, judicially divested of
his or her individuality and portrayed as an emblem of anti-family and malum
in se crime. While such a projection of fear onto a conjured target may serve
to dispel anxiety or the "unpleasant feeling,"' 99 its ameliorating effect is both
short lived and illusory. Such mythic images take on a life of their own, and
cyclically spawn more of the unpleasant feeling, the homophobia, which, in
turn needs a new outlet.
The end of prejudice has to mean an arrest of the defensive cycle itself.
It is not enough for courts to issue decisions that appear to confer a victory
on a lesbian or a gay male. Courts must do more than that and specifically
refrain from creating the mythic anti-self, the stereotype, or what Theodore
Roethke saw as the id-like "Dirty Dinky."2" As such, the cessation of the
discriminatory cycle entails the isolation of the force that propels it and thus,
requires true and even painful introspection. What it involves perhaps is a
meaningful judicial heeding of Roethke's admonition, "You may be Dirty
Dinky. "201
197. Id. (emphasis original) Sigmund Freud described negation as a process by which "the subject-
matter of a repressed image or thought can make its way into consciousness on condition that it is denied."
SIGMUND FREUD, Negation in A GENERAL SELECTION FROM THE WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 55
(Doubleday 1957). As Freud explained:
[Tihe original pleasure-ego tried to introject into itself everything that is good and to
reject from itself everything that is bad. From its point of view, what is bad, what is
alien to the other ego, and what is external are, to begin with identical.
Id.
198. HEREK, supra note 2, at 931.
199. Id.
200. ROETHKE, supra note 1.
201. Id.
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